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The  Power  of  Politics  for  Zambia’s  Public  Sector  Unions:  
A  Case  Study  of  the  2013  Nursing  Strikes  
  
Andrew  Stawasz  and  Thaddeus  Talbot  
Cornell  University  
  
Recent   pay   reform   efforts   in   Zambia   have   sought   to   generate   more   competitive   wages   and  
benefits   for  workers   in   the   public   sector.   However,   these   efforts   have   been   characterised   by  
inconsistent   policy   decisions   during  wage   negotiations.   Such   decisions   produce   distortions   in  
the   pay   structure   that   result   in   industrial   unrest   from   unions   in   the   public   sector.   Previous  
literature  has  not  examined  how  public  sector  unions  influence  these  outcomes  in  Zambia.  This  
article  examines  factors  that  affect  public  sector  unions’  influence  in  Zambia.  Seven  factors  were  
identified   after   analysing   the   2013   wage   negotiations   and   subsequent   nurses’   strikes   at   the  
University  Teaching  Hospital  (UTH)  as  an  extended  case  study.  Most  variables  decreased  union  
influence.  Outcomes  that  favour  unions  were  found  to  be  largely  the  result  of  the  government’s  
political  will.  Therefore,  political  will  was  determined   to  be   the   strongest  variable   influencing  





Efforts  at  Zambian  civil  service  pay  reform  have  attracted  a  considerable  amount  of  controversy  
in  recent  years.  Civil  servants,  who  are  characterised  by  some  as  being  overpaid,  
  received  a  200%  wage   increase   in  2013  (Mukanga,  2013).  Still,   there  has  been  a  high  rate  of  
industrial   unrest   from   civil   servants,   as   evidenced   by   all   ten   public   sector   unions   declaring   a  
dispute  with   government   in   20141.   At   the   centre   of   this   controversy   stand   the   unions,  which  
represent   public   sector  workers.   Since   negotiations   and   industrial   unrest   are   often   linked   to  
unions,  one  needs  to  examine  their  influence  during  negotiations  and  in  subsequent  conflict  to  
understand  this  seeming  paradox  of  substantial  wage  increases  and  labour  unrest.  
  
These   trends   were   illustrated   in   a   case   study   spanning   the   2013   public   sector   wage  
negotiations,  where  many   civil   servants  were  granted   considerable  wage   increments,   and   the  
subsequent  nursing  strikes  at  the  University  Teaching  Hospital  (UTH)  in  Lusaka.  By  using  this  
case  study  to  theorise  about  variables  that  give  unions  influence,  this  article  argues  that  public  
sector   unions   in   Zambia   are   not   influential   for   a  multitude   of   reasons,   and   that  many   of   the  
outcomes   commonly   attributed   to  unions   are   actually   the   result   of   the   government’s  political  
will.  While   the   unions   representing   civil   servants  who   received   the   largest   salary   increments  
clearly   benefited   from   the   government’s   political  will,   those   representing   nurses   lost   relative  
standing,  and  were  therefore  harmed  by  the  government’s  political  will  to  the  point  of  industrial  
unrest.  This  resolves  the  apparent  paradox  by  revealing  that  when  the  government’s   interests  
are   in   line   with   unions’,   as   with   those   who   were   granted   large   increments,   union-­‐friendly  
outcomes  occur,  but  when  they  conflict,  as  with  nurses’  unions,  outcomes  are  more  harmful.  
  
This  article  is  organised  into  five  sections.  The  Literature  Review  places  this  analysis  in  context  
by   demonstrating   the   need   for   a   systematic   look   at   exactly  what   variables   give   public   sector  
unions   influence.  The  Methodology  outlines  how   the  2013  wage  negotiations   and   subsequent  
UTH  strike  were  chosen  as  an  extended  case  study  and  how  interviews  were  conducted  to  learn  
more  about  it.  The  Background  presents  a  relevant  historical  overview  of  public  sector  unions  
and  a  chronology  of  events  related  to  our  case  study  to  illustrate  what  happened  in  2013.  The  
                                                                                                                           
  
1	  ‘Strike	  Watch’,	  2014.	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Results   discusses   what   variables   the   study   found   that   affect   union   influence.   The   Discussion  
analyses   these   findings   to   show   that   unions   do  not  wield  much  power,   then   summarises   and  




Historical  Trajectory  of  Public  Sector  Unions  in  Zambia’s  Third  Republic  
  
To   understand   the   state   of   Zambian   unions   today,   a   brief   history   of   the   Zambian   labour  
movement   is   useful.   At   Zambia’s   independence   in   1964,   its   labour  movement  was   one   of   the  
strongest  in  the  region,  but  it  has  since  lost  considerable  power,  especially  after  the  Movement  
for   Multiparty   Democracy   assumed   office   in   1991.   Symptomatic   of   this   weakening   is   the  
fragmentation   that   has   plagued   the   Zambian   labour   movement   since   then.   In   1994,   the  
Federation  of  Free  Trade  Unions  in  Zambia  was  formed  to  rival  the  Zambian  Congress  of  Trade  
Unions,   which   was   formerly   the   only   union   federation,   and   many   splinter   unions   emerged  
(Fashoyin,   2008;   Mulenga,   2011).   As   more   rival   unions   surfaced,   bargaining   power   of   the  
unions  relative  to  the  government  declined.  This  trend  of  diminishing  union  power  also  exists  in  
the  public  sector.    
  
Frustrations  with  worker  pay  and  benefits  have  made   the  civil   service  a  hotbed   for   industrial  
unrest.   Admittedly,   these   strikes   are   often   illegal   (Fashoyin,   2008;   Mulenga,   2011).   But,   as  
Fashoyin  notes,  ‘…in  Zambia,  colossal  impediments  are  placed  on  the  right  of  workers  to  strike’,  
making  it  practically  impossible  to  engage  in  a  legal  strike  in  many  cases  where  grievances  are  
time-­‐sensitive  (Fashoyin,  2007,  p.  2).  Public  sector  health  workers  in  particular  have  had  a  long  
history   of   striking   (see,   Leenstra,   2012).   The   government’s   usual   reaction   to   these   strikes   is  
characterised  as  ‘a  messy  combination  of  appeasement  and  repression’,  where  strikers  are  fired,  
sometimes  with  police   involvement,   but   are   later   reinstated,   sometimes  with   the  government  
conceding  workers’  demands,  which  sends  mixed  signals  (Leenstra,  2012,  p.  190).  
  
Before  the  Strikes  
  
One  major   issue  with  pay   reform   in  Zambia’s   civil   service   is   the  use  of  ad  hoc   and  piecemeal  
policies  by  the  government  to  rationalise  pay  structures.  Instead  of  stabilizing  annual  pay  levels  
for  most  jobs,  government  officials  agreed  to  offer  significant  allowances  to  a  few  industries  that  
eventually   caused   an   inflated   wage   bill   and   formed   incongruities   between   jobs’   content   and  
their   pay   (Valentine,   2002).   To   solve   this   problem,   the   government   introduced   the   Job  
Evaluation  and  Re-­‐Grading  (JERG)  exercise.  This  exercise  would  identify  the  appropriate  pay  for  
each   job   in   the  public   sector.  However,   the   JERG  exercise  was   largely  unsuccessful  because  of  
poor  implementation2.  
  
Decisions   from  some  government   leaders   conflicted  with   the  desired  outcomes  of  pay   reform  
efforts   and   offset   the   goals   of   the   JERG   exercise.   During   election   seasons,   for   example,   it   is  
common   for   government   officials   to   offer   union   leaders   higher   wages   and   allowances   than  
anticipated  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance   in  order  to  gain   favour   for  re-­‐election.  Overly  generous  
offers  inevitably  expand  the  wage  bill  and  undercut  the  JERG’s  purpose.  At  the  same  time,  these  
promises  force  the  Ministry  to  cut  programs  in  order  to  find  supplemental  funds.  Thus,  the  wage  
negotiations  following  the  JERG  exercise  inflated  the  wage  bill  (Kabamba,  2013),  and  indicated  
that  political  motivations  can  go  beyond  only  recommending  austerity  measures3.    
  
                                                                                                                           
  
2  Consultant  for  the  JERG  exercise,  interview,  June  2014.  
3  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
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In   April   of   2012,   unions   in   the   health   sector   began   the   process   of   wage   negotiations   by  
collecting   a   list   of   demands   from   their   members.   These   demands   were   then   delivered   to  
government  representatives  before  the  negotiations.  Union  leaders  were  all   invited  to  a  resort  
in  Siavonga  that  was  paid  for  by  the  government  to  negotiate4.    
  
Health   unions   representing   professionals,   like   nurses,   demanded   an   across-­‐the   board   wage  
increase   for   their   members5.   While   the   government   agreed   to   provide   a   100-­‐200%   wage  
increase   for   non-­‐professional   workers   in   the   health   sector,   they   would   not   grant   a   similar  
increment  to  the  nurses.  This  was  because  of  the  favourable  increment  nurses  received  in  2012.  
The   government’s   efforts   to   harmonise  wages   in   an   effort   to   eliminate   large   gaps   in   the   pay  
structure  meant  that  the  lower  paid  workers,  including  non-­‐professional  health  workers,  were  
given  significantly  larger  increments  than  professionals,  who  were  already  earning  much  more6.  
Nurses  were  given  a  4%  wage  increase  coupled  with  a  17%  total   increase  to  allowances  (GRZ  
and  CSAWUZ,  2013).  Once  the  agreements  were  signed  in  April  and  May,  unions  informed  their  





In  September  2013,  while  they  were  supposed  to  get  a  4%  increment  on  their  basic  salary,  some  
nurses’  payslips  amounted  to  only  1.1%.  Health  Minister  Kasonde  claimed  this  was  merely  as  a  
result  of  payroll  errors9.  However,  this  was  not  enough  to  assuage  nurses,  who  began  their  first  
strike   on   or   about   the   2   October10.   In   addition   to   the   payroll   issue,   nurses   cited   the   issue   of  
being  paid  similar  wages  as  less-­‐educated  non-­‐professionals.  Operations  at  UTH  were  severely  
hurt  by  the  strike11.  Both  government  and  union  representatives  implored  the  nurses  to  return  
to  work12.  On  the  9  October,  some  nurses  did  return  after  their  union  convinced  them  to13.  
  
Political  players  were  deeply   involved.  Hakainde  Hichilema,  the   leader  of  the  opposition  party  
United  Party  for  National  Development,  wrote  to  President  Michael  Sata  siding  with  the  striking  
nurses14.  Sata  responded  by  accusing  Hichilema  of  politicising  the  issue  and  even  calling  him  a  
‘Merchant   of   death’15,   revealing   the   degree   of   opposition   to   the   strike   from   the   ruling   party.  
Meanwhile,   on   or   about   the   10  October,  when  Health  Minister   Joseph  Kasonde   tried   to  meet  
with  strikers,   they  refused  to  meet  with  him16.  Around  that  same  time,  Kasonde  threatened  to  
charge   striking   nurses  with   absenteeism,   calling   the   strike   illegal17.  When  Minister   of   Labour  
Fackson   Shamenda   visited   strikers   and   viewed  one  nurse’s   payslip,   he   appeared   surprised   at  
                                                                                                                           
  
4  Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
5  Representative  of  National  Union  of  Public  Service  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
6  Neo   Simutanyi,   interview,   July   2014;   Union   representative,   interview,   July   2014;   Expert   on   Zambian  
labour   relations,   interview,   July   2014;   Representative   of   Zambia   Union   of   Nurses   Organisation   #1,  
interview,   July  2014;  Representative  of  National  Union  of  Public  Service  Workers,   interview,   July  2014;  
Representative  of  Health  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
7  Representative   of   Zambia   Union   of   Nurses   Organisation   #1,   interview,   July   2014;   Representative   of  
Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
8  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
9  ‘Nurses  Feel  Cheated’,  2013.  
10  ‘Nurses  and  Midwives’,  2013.  
11  ‘UTH  Paralysed’,  2013.  
12  ‘Government  Working’,  2013.  
13  ‘Nurses  Call’,  2013.  
14  ‘HH  Writes’,  2013.  
15  ‘President  Sata  Attacks’,  2013,  para.  1.  
16  ‘UTH  Nurses  Refuse’,  2013.  
17  ‘Nurses  to  be  Charged’,  2013.  
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how   little   they   were   being   paid   and   promised   to  make   the   changes   they   were   demanding18.  
Union   representatives   also   met   with   strikers   to   assure   them   they   would   address   their  




The   second   nurses’   strike   began   on   the   22   November   following   the   government’s   failure   to  
rectify  the  issues  Shamenda  promised  to  address20.  In  addition  to  the  issues  carried  over  from  
previous   strike,   some   nurses   demanded   a   100%   salary   increment21.   This   strike   further   hurt  
operations  at  UTH22.  In  addition  to  the  government,  union  officials  also  pushed  nurses  to  return  
to  work   to   promote   smoother   negotiations  with   government23.   Immediately   after   they   began  
striking,   nurses   demanded   to  meet  with  Minister   Shamenda24,   but   he   refused25.   He   later  met  
with  union  representatives,  telling  them  that  the  strike  is  illegal  and  that  nurses  can  be  fired26.  
  
The  government  gave  an  ultimatum  on  the  28  November  that  workers  had  to  report  by  17:00  or  
they   would   be   charged  with   unexcused   absences27,   but   nurses   refused   to   cooperate28.  When  
they  were   issued  exculpatory   letters,  nurses  even  refused   to  collect   them29,   suggesting  strong  
animosity  between  nurses  and  the  government.  By  December,  some  UTH  nurses  had  returned  
to   work30.   But   by   the   2   December,   100   UTH   nurses   had   been   dismissed.   This   crippled  
operations  to  the  point  that  the  main  UTH  operating  theatre  had  been  forced  to  close31.  By  the  
next   week,   234   nurses   had   been   fired   nationwide32.   In   all,   570   nurses   were   fired33.   In   the  
interim,  an  estimated  250  nurses  were  allowed  to  reapply  as  new  employees,  an  unprecedented  
outcome   in   Zambia.34  Nurses   were   only   fully   reinstated   in   December   2014,   about   a   year  
afterward35.  This  further  hurt  operations  at  UTH  in  the  meantime36.  
  
These   issues   continued   to   be   politicised   by   opposition   political   parties.   Representatives   from  
both  the  United  Party   for  National  Development  and  the  Movement   for  Multiparty  Democracy  
                                                                                                                           
  
18  Representative  of  UTH  Department  of  Surgery,  interview,  June  2014;  Union  representative,  interview,  
July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
19  Two   representatives   of   Civil   Servants   and   Allied   Workers   Union   of   Zambia,   interview,   July   2014;  
Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
20  ‘UTH  Nurses  Strike  Again’,  2013.  
21  ‘Strike  by  Nurses’,  2013.  
22  ‘Nurses  Strike  Continues’,  2013.  
23  ‘Union  Wants’,  2013;  Representative  of  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  
Two  representatives  of  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.    
24  ‘Strike  by  Nurses’,  2013.  
25  ‘Nurses  Strike  Continues’,  2013.  
26  ‘Nurses’  Strike  is  Illegal’,  2013.  
27  ‘Government  Gives  Nurses’,  2013.  
28  ‘Nurses  Defy  Government’s  Threats’,  2013.  
29  ‘Striking  UTH,  Livingstone  Nurses’,  2013.  
30  ‘Some  Nurses  at  UTH’,  2013.  
31  ‘Over  100  Nurses’,  2013.  
32  ‘More  UTH  Nurses  Fired’,  2013.  
33  ‘Re-­‐instating  Fired  Nurses’,  2014.  
34  Former  World  Bank  expert,  interview,  June  2014.  
35  ‘Re-­‐instating  Fired  Nurses’,  2014.  
36  Representative  of  the  University  of  Zambia  School  of  Medicine,  interview,  June  2014;  Representative  of  
the   UTH   Department   of   Surgery,   interview,   June   2014;   Representative   of   the   UTH   Department   of  
Medicine,  interview,  June  2014.  
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rallied  around  fired  nurses37.  Despite  this,  the  government  held  strong  for  a  long  time  that  they  
would  not  reinstate  fired  nurses38.  
  
Civil  Service  Pay  Reform  Efforts  in  Zambia  
  
The   Zambian   civil   service   is   in   need   of   pay   reform.   Valentine   argued   for   the   need   of   more  
systematic   pay   reform   as   opposed   to   the   ad   hoc   and   piecemeal   approaches   that   had   come  
before   and   left   many   distortions   in   the   civil   service   pay   structure,   where   similarly   qualified  
workers   received   different   salaries.   Without   substantive   pay   reform,   the   government   would  
continue  to  struggle  to  attract,  retain,  and  motivate  quality  personnel,  and  would  cause  deviant  
work  behaviours,  such  as  leaving  the  workplace  during  work  hours  to  engage  in  other  income-­‐
supplementing  activities  and  corruption  (Valentine,  2002).  
  
Valentine   (2002)   also   argued   for   reform   to   correct   an   inflated   public   sector   wage   bill.  
Historically,  civil  servants  have  received  substantial  concessions  from  government  (see,  Kiragu  
and   Mukandala,   2003).   This   has   negative   implications   for   Zambia’s   economic   standing.   The  
Public   Service  Management  Division,   or   PSMD,   (2009)   notes,   ‘Given   the   current  wage   bill-­‐to-­‐
domestic  revenue  ratio,  Zambia  has  already  approaching  [sic]  the  upper  limits  of  prudent  wage  
bill   growth’   (p.   2).   As   this   takes   away   from   Zambia’s   financial   capacity,   the   International  
Monetary   Fund   (IMF)   and   World   Bank   have   long   recommended   against   the   Zambian  
government  granting   large  wage   increases   to  public   servants,  as   they  had  been  doing  (Kiragu  
and   Mukandala,   2003).   Efforts   to   enact   reform   to   address   all   of   these   issues,   which   entail  
limiting  salary  increases,  are  ongoing  (See,  e.g.,  PSMD,  2009;  PSMD,  2012;  GRZ,  2012).  
  
Historically,  pay  reform  efforts  in  Zambia  have  not  come  easily.  Kiragu  and  Mukandala  (2003)  
note,   ‘The   process   of   pay   reform   in   Zambia   has   been   overshadowed   by   policy   reversals,  
slowness,   hesitancy   and   at   times   inaction’   (p.   188).   The   public   service   unions   that   have  
historically  won  large  gains  for  members  are  cited  as  one  big  reason  for  this  inefficiency.  Kiragu  
and   Mukandala   (2002)   also   observe,   ‘Zambia   fits   the   general   observation   that   the   more  
organised  and  militant   the   trade  unions   are,   the   stronger   the   influence  of   ‘politics’   in   the  pay  
reform  process’  (p.  204),  where   ‘politics’,  as  used  in  this  context,  are  a   large  factor  hampering  
reform  efforts39.  The  apparent   tradeoff  between  public  sector  union   influence  and  pay  reform  
success   is   also   embodied   in  Fashoyin’s   (2008)  discussion  of   efforts   to   improve  public   service  
efficiency  between  1997  and  2000  when  he  calls  these  efforts’  effects  ‘destabilizing’  for  unions,  
as   they   limited   unions’   abilities   to   obtain   large   gains   for  members   (p.   3).   Current   efforts   are  
similarly  aimed  at   improving  efficiency,  and  therefore  have   the  potential   to  come   into  conflict  
with  unions’  claims  to  power  (see,  e.g.,  PSMD,  2009;  PSMD,  2012;  GRZ,  2012).  
  
However,   some  scholars  posit   that  union-­‐employer  relationships  need  not  be  adversarial,  and  
that  allowing  unions  more  power  may  in  some  instances  actually  help  realise  the  interests  of  the  
employing   class   (see,  Wright,   2000).   Regardless   of  whether   the   relationship   is   adversarial   or  
not,   it   is   clear   that  unions  and  public   sector   reform  efforts  affect  one  another.  Therefore,   it   is  
important   to   understand   unions’   influence   to   fully   understand   dynamics   surrounding   public  
service  reform  efforts.  However,  no  systematic  study  has  looked  at  such  variables  for  Zambian  
public  sector  unions.  That  is  the  void  that  this  study  looks  to  fill.  
  
                                                                                                                           
  
37  ‘Reinstate  the  Nurses’,  2013;  ‘President  Sata  Should  Visit’,  2013.  
38  ‘Government  Will  Not  Reinstate’,  2013.  
39  As  one  reviewer  pointed  out,   it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assert   that  hampering  reform  involves  politics  
while   implementing   reform   is   apolitical.   This   definition   of   ‘politics’   as   hampering   reform   presents   the  
connotation  used  by  Kiragu  and  Mukandala,  but  should  not  be  generalised  to  believe  that  implementing  
reform  is  not  itself  inherently  political.  
  
     





The  object  of  this  report  is  to  determine  variables  that  affect  union  influence  in  the  public  sector  
in  Zambia.  In  order  to  carry  out  this  analysis,  a  useful  working  definition  of  union  influence  had  
to   be   determined.   Edwards   (1978),  who   speaks   of   union   influence   as   union   power,   observes  
that   ‘power   has   several   dimensions   or   faces   and   it  would   be   futile   to   attempt   to   encapsulate  
these  complex  processes  in  one  operational  measure’  (p.  1).  Therefore,  she  argues,  an  indicator  
of   power   or   influence   that   is   amenable   to  measurement   should   be   used,   even   if   it   is   not   all-­‐
encompassing.  Given  a   largely  qualitative  study,  as  with   this  report,   these  measurements  may  
not  be  fully  quantified.  
  
McDonald  and  Suen  (1992),  in  their  efforts  to  measure  union  power,  present  an  economically-­‐
focused  definition  of  union  power  as  ‘the  ability  of  the  trade  union  to  divide  up  to  its  advantage  
the   rents   arising   from   the  production  process   given  other  parameters’   (p.   209).   In   the  public  
sector,   this   could   be   translated   to   influencing   the   allocation   of   government   revenue   so   that  
union  members  get  a  larger  share  in  the  form  of  pay  and  benefits.  While  this  study  was  largely  
qualitative,  moments  when  unions   influenced  pay  and  benefits  were   still   apparent  within   the  
case  study.  
  
However,  while   influencing   resources   allocated   to  members’   pay   and  benefits   is   undoubtedly  
important,  this  limited  definition  ignores  other  important  ways  unions  may  be  influential,  even  
when   they   are   not   directly   affecting   the   allocation   of   resources   to   pay   and   benefits.   Unions’  
influence  may  manifest  itself  in  a  number  of  other  ways,  both  formally  and  informally,  that  are  
important   when   considering   issues   in   the   Zambian   civil   service.   To   limit   the   focus   to   a  
manageable  number  of  verifiable  factors,  this  study  defines  union  influence  as  a  union’s  ability  
to  effect  tangible  changes  in  the  interests  of  its  members.  The  major  tangible  changes  identified  
in  this  study  include  gaining  higher  pay  and  benefits  for  its  members  and  protecting  members  
from  unemployment.  
  
To   determine   variables   that   affect   union   influence,   a   case   study  was   utilised,  which   involved  
negotiations   for   the   public   service   collective   agreement   enacted   in   September   2013,   the  
subsequent   strikes   at   the   government-­‐run   UTH,   and   their   after-­‐effects.   This   case   study   was  
chosen  because  it  gives  a  clear  illustration  of  the  ability  of  unions  to  effect  change  for  members,  
and  involves  a  clear  portrayal  of  the  apparent  paradox  outlined  earlier.  Unions  seemed  to  ‘win’  
during   the   negotiations   but   still   saw   the   industrial   unrest   characterised   by   the   strikes.   The  
findings   were   then   used   to   theorise   about   variables   that   affect   union   influence   in   Zambia’s  
public  sector.  
  
To   learn   about   this   case   study,   various   online   sources   were   consulted,   including   the   Lusaka  
Times  and  Zambian  Economist,  to  generate  a  basic  timeline  of  events.  To  gain  further  insight,  a  
total   of   21   semi-­‐structured   interviews   were   held   with   academics,   political   analysts,   and  
representatives   from   the   Zambian   government,   various   union   leaders,   doctors   at   UTH,   and  
former   UTH   nurses.   Questions   were   open-­‐ended   and   dealt   mainly   with   determining   what  
occurred   during   these   case   studies   and   why   alternative   courses   of   action   were   not   taken.  
Trends  that  emerged  from  these  interviews  were  identified  and  used  to  theorise  about  variables  
affecting   union   influence.   Of   course,   the   trends   identified   are   based   on   respondents’  
perceptions,   which   may   not   always   fully   reflect   reality.   But   even   understanding   how   others  







     





The  following  variables  represent  themes  found  across  multiple  interviews  that  seem  to  affect  
union   influence.  Most  of   these  variables,   including  union   splintering,   relative   information  and  
preparedness,   communication,   finances,   the   law,   courts,   and   norms,   and   external   players,   all  
worked  to   lower  union   influence.  The  political  will  of   the  government,  however,  was   found  to  
either   increase   or   decrease   union   influence,   making   it   a   major   determinant   of   outcomes   for  
unions.   When   political   will   was   aligned   with   unions’   desires,   union-­‐friendly   outcomes   were  
seen,   but   when   they   conflicted,   outcomes   were   more   detrimental   to   unions.   Each   of   these  




Union   representatives   consistently   indicated   the   importance   of   union   splintering   in   lowering  
their   influence.  Acting   in  congruence  during  wage  negotiations  optimises  unions’   influence;  as  
such  congruence  can  have  the  psychological  effect  of  making  union  demands  appear  stronger,  
thereby   increasing   government   concessions40.   This   can   also   increase   the   likelihood   that   each  
union   benefits   similarly   from   negotiations.   However,   this   congruence   is   disrupted   by   the  
bargaining   structure,   which   requires   that   unions   negotiate   with   government   representatives  
separately.   For   example,   while   Zambia’s   three   health   unions   bargain   as   one   unit,   that   unit  
bargains   separately   from   non-­‐health   unions   at   times,   reducing   how   harmonised   unions’  
demands   are   and   weakening   their   stances41.   If   some   unions   are   especially   successful   in  
negotiations,   then   there   is   less   for   the  other  unions   to  gain,   incentivising   this   competition   for  
government’s  finite  resources  when  bargaining  separately,  as  each  union  wants  to  achieve  the  
best  outcomes  for  its  members42.  This  led  to  at  least  one  union  accepting  the  2013  agreement,  
which  benefited   its  members  considerably,  even   though   it  was  known  to  be  at   the  expense  of  
other  civil  service  unions’  members43.  
  
We   found   that,   for   unions,   the   bargaining   structure   creating   a   ceiling   for   government  
concessions   is   problematic.   Although   they  bargain   as   a   joint   team44,   bargaining   outcomes   are  
significantly   diminished   as   concessions  made   by   some   unions   set   precedents   for   others.   For  
example,  the  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia  (CSAWUZ)  represents  workers  
across  various  industries,  including  health.  Since  the  CSAWUZ  is  the  first  to  sign  an  agreement,  if  
they   accept   a  mediocre   agreement,   the   government   is   unwilling   to   grant   other   health   unions  
better   outcomes,   creating   a   ceiling   for   these   unions45 .   Some   therefore   signed   the   2013  
agreement  only  reluctantly46.  
  
Moreover,   this   trend  of  union  splintering   is   so  pervasive   that   some  even  go  so   far  as   to  claim  
that   unions   are   created   by   the   government   to   mitigate   the   demands   of   other   unions47.   This  
                                                                                                                           
  
40  Union  representative,  interview,  July  2014;  Representative  of  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #1,  
interview,  July  2014.  
41  Union  representative,  interview,  July  2014;  Representative  of  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #1,  
interview,  July  2014;  Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,   interview,  
July  2014.  
42  Two  representatives  of  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
43  Representative  of  National  Union  of  Public  Service  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
44  Neo  Simutanyi,  interview,  July  2014.  
45  Representative  of  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Two  representatives  
of  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
46   Representative   of   Zambia   National   Union   of   Health   and   Allied   Workers,   interview,   July   2014;  
Representative  of  Health  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
47  Two  representatives  of  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
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occurs   during   times   of   industrial   unrest   when   the   government   promotes   emerging   union  
leaders   to   administrative  positions   in  newly   formed  unions   to   serve   as   echoing   chambers   for  
the   government’s   opinions48.   According   to   the   Industrial   and   Labour   Relations   Act,   only   100  
members   are   required   to   register   a  union49,  making   it   easy   for   the   government   to  proliferate  
these   unions.   As   the   presence   of  more   government-­‐friendly   unions   increase,   demands   at   the  
bargaining   table   become   less   aggressive.   This   results   in   further   decentralising   the   labour  
movement.  
  
The  politicisation  of  union  membership  is  another  component  of  union  splintering  that  reduces  
union  influence.  When  the  2013  Collective  Agreement  was  released  and  it  was  discovered  that  
professional  health  staff  were  displeased,  some  representatives  from  health  unions  were  quick  
to   blame   others.   In   doing   so,   they   hoped   to   attract  members   to   their   union   from   the   blamed  
unions50.  This  politicisation  continued  even  during   the  strikes  at  UTH.  While  all  health  unions  
publicly  condemned  the  illegal  strikes,  some  union  representatives  allegedly  justified  the  strikes  
in  private  discussions  with  workers51.  Thus,  some  unions  may  support  a  strike  even  if  they  are  
unable   to   protect   workers   from   unemployment   so   that   they   might   attract   members   by  
appearing   to   be   on   their   side.   This   undermines   the   clarity   of   the   message   communicated   to  
workers,   which   makes   unions’   attempts   to   protect   workers   by   condemning   the   strike   less  
effective.  
  
Relative  Information  and  Preparedness  
  
Unions   and   government   officials   showed   that   the   relative   information   and   preparedness   of  
unions  and   the  government  also  hurts  union   influence.  According   to  one  union   leader,  unions  
generally  have  a  limited  access  to  and  understanding  of  national  economic  information  than  the  
government.  When  the  government  provides  an  economic  explanation  for  their  decisions,  some  
unions   are   unable   to   respond,  which   hurts   their   arguments   because   they   do   not   address   the  
alleged   economic   constraints   faced   by   the   government.   Although   unions   have   researchers  
tasked  with  preparing  the  union  to  understand  and  rebut  economic  arguments,  their  efforts  are  
often   in  vain.  This  union   leader  even  claimed   that  union  researchers  are   researchers   in  name  
alone52.  The  government,  on  the  other  hand,  has  the  Ministry  of  Finance  on  its  bargaining  team  
specifically   focusing   on   discussing   economic   and   financial   constraints53.   Moreover,   outside  
organisations  such  as  the  World  Bank  are  dedicated  to  equipping  the  government  with  financial  
information   to   take   into   negotiations   so   they   are   less   susceptible   to   union   pressure54.   This  
information   imbalance   means   the   government   can   make   claims   that   unions   have   difficulty  
countering,   leading   to   the   government   possibly   even   fabricating   facts   at   times   to   affect  
outcomes,  which  the  unions  would  have  difficulty  detecting55.  This  lowers  what  unions  are  able  
to  effectively  demand.  
  
                                                                                                                           
  
48   Ibid.   Also   see   Mulenga,   2011   for   a   discussion   of   powerful   labour   leaders   being   co-­‐opted   into  
government  positions,  a  similar  tactic  that  further  divides  the  labour  movement.  
49  University  of  Zambia  labour  law  expert,  interview,  July  2014  
50  Representative   of   Zambia   Union   of   Nurses   Organisation   #1,   interview,   July   2014;   Representative   of  
Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
51  Union  representative,  interview,  July  2014;  Representative  of  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #1,  
interview,  July  2014;  Representative  of  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
52  Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
53  Representative  of   the  Ministry  of  Finance  #1,   interview,   June  2014;  Representative  of   the  Ministry  of  
Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
54  Representative  of  the  World  Bank,  interview,  June  2014.  
55  Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
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Having  information  is  not  enough  to  effectively  bargain.  There  is  also  a  need  for  practice.  Before  
negotiations,   the   government   coordinates   a   series   of   mock   bargaining   sessions   involving  
different   ministries.   This   mock   bargaining   involved   several   meetings   where   the   Ministry   of  
Finance   presents   a   sample   budget   and   is   challenged   to   test   their   ability   to   respond56.   These  
practices   ensure   that   the   government   is   aware   of   and   is   ready   to   respond   to   possible   union  
challenges.  Without  similar  preparedness,  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  for  unions  to  obtain  
higher  wages  and  benefits.  One  union  leader  noted  that  if  the  International  Labour  Organisation  
provided   training   and   technical   assistance   to   public   sector   unions,   labour   leaders  would   feel  
more   prepared   during   negotiations   and   there   would   perhaps   be   more   labour-­‐friendly  
outcomes.  However,  this  does  not  occur57,  so  unions  are  left  without  the  international  support  
government   receives.   Public   sector   unions   have   been   criticised   as   being   ineffective   in  




Unions  noted  that  miscommunication  between  the  government  and  workers  can  inflate  worker  
expectations  beyond  the  unions’  ability  to  meet  them,  leading  to  a  lack  of  faith  in  unions  and  a  
lack   of   an   ability   for   the   union   to   control   members.   To   appear   generous   to   its   workers,   the  
government   announced   that   wages   had   been   increased   by   100-­‐200%   for   public   servants  
following   the   signing   of   the   2013   Collective   Agreements   without   clearly   explaining   that   the  
highest  increments  were  concentrated  among  non-­‐professionals.  The  announcement  led  nurses  
to  believe  that  they  were  also  receiving  a  large  increment59.  These  targeted  raises  were  part  of  
efforts   to   pay   all   civil   servants   a   living   wage,   which   necessitated   larger   increases   for   the  
poorest-­‐paid60.   The   fact   that   nurses   only   received   a   4%   wage   increase   created   resentment  
because   they   were   expecting   much   higher   salary   increments.   This   contributed   to   their  
motivation   to   strike   against   unions’   wills61.   This   strike   without   unions’   support   hurt   unions’  
influence  because  it  diminished  their  ability  to  protect  members  from  unemployment  when  the  
government   fired  the  nurses.   It  was  hard  for  unions  to  prevent  the   illegal  strike,  which  would  
have  prevented  the  government  from  firing  the  workers.  
  
Nurses   especially   showed   that   miscommunication   from   unions   for   political   reasons   can   also  
play   a   role   in   decreasing   trust.   Once   the   negotiations   ended   in   April,   union   representatives  
travelled  throughout  the  country  to  explain  the  outcomes  to  the  worker62.  Some  representatives  
told  their  members  that  they  received  a  21%  increment  without  explaining  that  this  entailed  a  
4%   wage   increase   and   17%   total   increases   in   allowances   in   order   to   make   the   bargaining  
outcomes   sound   more   impressive.   In   October,   nurses   were   surprised   to   find   that   they   only  
received  a  4%  wage  increment  on  their  pay  slips,  as  they  were  expecting  a  21%  wage  increase63.  
Some   nurses   had   not   heard   the   breakdown   of   the   21%   increment   until   a  meeting  with   their  
union   the   day   before   the  October   strike   started   to   clarify   the  wage   differentials.   This  was   an  
                                                                                                                           
  
56  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
57  Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
58  Former   UTH   nurse   #1,   interview,   July   2014;   Former   UTH   nurse   #2,   interview,   July   2014;   see   also:  
Mboozi,  2014.  
59  Consultant   to   the   JERG   exercise,   interview,   June   2014;   Union   representative,   interview,   July   2014;  
Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
60  Representative   of   the  World  Bank,   interview,   June  2014;  Union   representative,   interview,   July   2014;  
Expert   on   Zambian   labour   relations,   interview,   July   2014;   Representative   of   Zambia   Union   of   Nurses  
Organisation   #1,   interview,   July   2014;   Representative   of   National   Union   of   Public   Service   Workers,  
interview,  July  2014.  
61  Union  representative,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014.  
62  Representative   of   Zambia   Union   of   Nurses   Organisation   #1,   Lusaka   July   2014;   Representative   of  
Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
63  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
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issue   for   nurses   because   the   taxation   structure   meant   that   the   net   take-­‐home   pay   was   less  
under  the  actual  breakdown  than  it  would  have  been  if   the  21%  were  a  pure  wage  increase.64  
Furthermore,   Zambian   law  dictates   that  public   servants’   allowances   can  be   lowered,  whereas  
base   salary   cannot,   meaning   nurses   felt   that   this   arrangement   was  more   precarious   than   an  
increase   only   to   basic   salary   would   have   been65.   Thus,   the   4%   wage   increment   provoked  
animosity   towards   unions   because   nurses   felt   their   unions   had   cheated   and   lied   to   them,  
creating  further  distrust  that  made  it  harder  for  union  leaders  to  quell  the  strikes.  
  
A  general  lack  of  communication  between  unions  and  their  members  has  further  adverse  effects  
on  the  union’s  ability  to  protect  worker  interests.  While  some  union  leaders  claimed  that  they  
request   worker   demands   prior   to   bargaining   in   order   to   represent   those   demands   at   the  
bargaining   table,  many  workers   insisted   that   they  were  not  kept  abreast   about  developments  
during  the  negotiations.  Infrequent  meetings  and  an  overall  lack  of  sharing  information  after  the  
negotiations,   whether   this   is   the   result   of   apathy   from   the   union   or   external   constraints  
preventing   more   effective   communication,   cultivated   animosity   between   nurses   and   their  
unions66.   Nurses  were   less   likely   to   listen   to   the   advice   of   their   union   representatives.   Since  
workers   lost   faith   in   their   unions’   ability   to   enforce   their   demands   they   resorted   to   striking  
despite   union   objections67.   This   made   it   more   difficult   for   unions   to   protect   workers   from  
unemployment.  
  
The   relationship   between   union   leaders   and   their   members   is   affected   by   this   strained  
communication,  which  further  diminishes  union  influence.  A  gap  in  trust  between  both  groups  
exists,  which  adversely  affects  how  well  unions  can  protect  their  members  from  unemployment.  
The  fact  that  nurses  struck  despite  unions’  objections  highlights  a  lack  of  trust  in  their  unions,  as  
the   unions   had   allegedly   failed   to   communicate   the   outcome   of   the   2013   agreement.   Nurses  
tend   to   perceive   their   unions   more   as   a   business   or   a   government   apparatus   than   as   an  
advocate   for   them.  One  nurse  who  was   fired  during   the  strike  even  speculated   that  her  union  
was   bribed   by   the   government   to   remain   idle   during   the   firings.   Symbolically,   she   no   longer  
wears   her   union’s   badge   even   though   she   had   before,   even   after   being   offered   the   chance   to  
reapply68.  Union  leaders  also  recognise  the  distrust  between  unions  and  members.  Some  union  
leaders  claim  that  certain  unions  are  primarily  focused  on  maximising  revenue  from  members’  
dues   and   no   longer   represent   the   voice   of   their   members,   meaning   that   there   is   a   lack   of  
motivation   to   bargain   for   what   is   best   for   members.   As   a   result,   members   are   no   longer  
interested  in  working  to  improve  the  union69.  The  prevalence  of  trust  issues  has  harmful  effects  
on  the  unions’  bargaining  leverage  because  the  government  sees  union  leaders  as  incapable  of  
controlling  or  representing  their  own  membership.  This  makes  the  government   less  willing  to  
take  unions  seriously  in  negotiations.  This  also  hinders  unions’  ability  to  protect  workers  from  





Interviews  with  government  representatives  revealed  how  their  financial  constraints  limit  what  
unions  can  get   in   the  way  of  wages  and  benefits.  The  Ministry  of  Finance  sets  parameters   for  
                                                                                                                           
  
64  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014.  
65  Two   representatives   of   Civil   Servants   and   Allied   Workers   Union   of   Zambia,   interview,   July   2014;  
Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
66  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
67  Representative   from   the   UTH   Department   of   Medicine,   interview,   June   2014;   Union   representative,  
Livingsone,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014.  
68  Former  UTH  Nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014.    
69  Representative  of  Health  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  July  2014,  Lusaka  
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negotiations   that   are   based   on   the   economic   performance   of   the   country.   If   the   economy   is  
struggling   based   on   their   metrics,   margins   for   concessions   become   slim70.   Other   financial  
interests   can   also   limit   concessions.   For   example,   the   government   is   aiming   to   purchase   a   $1  
Eurobond.  To  build  credit  for  this,  it  decided  to  limit  the  number  of  concessions  it  made  during  
negotiations,   leading   to   the   imposition   of   a   two-­‐year   wage   freeze   to   seem   more  
developmentally-­‐minded.   Additionally,   the   government   was   under   pressure   from   the  
international  players  like  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  to  diversify  spending  habits,  which  also  
contributed   to   a   desire   to   send   the  message   that   Zambia   is  working   to   become  more   fiscally  
responsible  as   it   looks   to  purchase   this  Eurobond71.  The   fact   that  unions   sometimes   resort   to  
sharing   ideas   on  how   to   broaden   the   tax   base   and   generate   revenue72,  which   is   outside   their  
area  of   expertise,   shows   their  desperation   to  overcome   the   limits  on  what  unions   can  gain   in  
bargaining  set  by  the  government’s  financial  limitations.  Furthermore,  the  government  is  able  to  
concretise  their  parameters  because  they  pass  annual  national  budgets  before  negotiating  with  
unions  that  set  ceilings  for  total  possible  concessions73.  
  
Union  finances  also  affect  their  influence.  Because  all  workers  in  the  public  sector  are  covered  
by  the  same  terms  of  service  regardless  of  union  membership  status,   free  riding,  or  benefiting  
from  union  negotiations  without  contributing   to   the  union   financially,   is  a  sizeable  problem74.  
The  government  was  able  to  leverage  unions’  resulting  financial  desperation,  which  left  them  no  
choice  but  to  rely  on  the  government  to  pay  for  hosting  negotiations.  The  government  paid  for  
accommodations   for  everyone   involved  during   the  2013  negotiations   in  Siavonga.  This  meant  
that  the  government  was  able  to  decide  when  to  hold  negotiations.  They  scheduled  them  within  
a  few  weeks  of  the  previous  Collective  Agreement  expiring.  If  unions  let  it  expire,  their  members  
would   either   go  without   pay   or   be   paid   by   unions,  which   unions   cannot   afford   to   sustain   for  
long.   This   created   desperation   to   reach   an   agreement   before   expiration,   leading   to   unions  
agreeing   to  worse   terms   than   they  would  have   liked   in  order   to   reach  any  agreement  at  all75.  
Furthermore,  an   inability   to  pay  means  unions  were  unable   to  help   fired  nurses  except   in   the  
most  economically  challenging  cases76,  so  nurses  now  see  just  how  much  they  have  to  lose  and  
are   now   less   willing   to   put   themselves   in   harm’s   way77.   This   lowers   strike   leverage   and  
therefore   bargaining   outcomes,   as   the   government   would   be   more   motivated   to   make  
concessions   to   avoid   strikes   if   unions’   strike   leverage   were   higher78.   In   these   ways,   unions’  
limited  finances  lowered  their  influence.  
  
The  Law,  Courts,  and  Norms  
  
Labour   laws   affect   the   level   of   influence   unions   have   in   wage   negotiations   by   facilitating  
splintering.  The  Industrial  and  Labour  Relations  Act,  for  example,  allows  for  the  proliferation  of  
unions  in  a  single  industry,  as  it  takes  only  100  workers  to  form  a  union.  Although  mandatory  
union  provisions  of   the  Act  often  go  unenforced,   it   still   facilitates   significant   splintering79.   So-­‐
                                                                                                                           
  
70  Representative  of   the  Ministry  of  Finance  #1,   interview,   June  2014;  Representative  of   the  Ministry  of  
Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
71  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
72  Representative  of  Health  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  June  2014.  
73  Representative  of  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
74  Representative  of  National  Union  of  Public   Service  Workers,   interview,   June  2014;  Representative  of  
Health  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  June  2014.  
75  Representative  of  Zambia  National  Union  of  Health  and  Allied  Workers,  interview,  July  2014.  
76  Two  representatives  of  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
77  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
78  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014;  Representative  of  Health  Workers  
Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
79  University  of  Zambia  labour  law  expert,  interview,  July  2014.  
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called   ‘splinter   unions’   end   up   competing   with   other   unions   for   bargaining   power   and  
dominance   in   the   industry.   Assuming   wage   negotiations   are   zero-­‐sum,   splinter   unions   can  
hinder  the  ability  of  other  unions  to  gain  higher  wages  and  benefits80.    
  
Strike  leverage  is  also  affected  by  the  Act.  It  stipulates  that  any  strike  is  considered  illegal  until  a  
long   list   of   dispute   resolution   alternatives   is   exhausted.   On   the   one   hand,   this   law   helps  
maintain  industrial  peace  by  disincentivising  strikes81.  On  the  other  hand,  it  makes  striking  for  
immediate  results  virtually  impossible82.  What  is  more,  workers  in  ‘essential  services’,  including  
UTH  nurses,  can  engage  only  in  illegal  strikes  because  the  law  bars  such  workers  from  striking  
legally.  This  is  risky  because  the  government  reserves  the  right  to  enforce  summary  dismissal,  
an  expedited  discharge  meant  to  protect  public  interests  by  firing  any  worker  acting  outside  the  
law  without  the  warnings  that  would  otherwise  be  required83.  This  makes  it  difficult  for  a  union  
to  protect  members  from  unemployment.  Admittedly,  despite  what  the  law  says,  the  Industrial  
and  Labour  Relations  Court  has  at  times  decided  not  to  uphold  such  a  firing  when  it  deemed  a  
strike  reasonable84.  But  such  an  outcome  was  not  afforded   to   fired  UTH  nurses85.  This   lowers  
strike  leverage  and  hinders  a  union’s  ability  to  protect  workers  from  unemployment.  
  
The   court   system   also   plays   a   role   in   determining   union   influence.   At   times,   the   government  
makes   unilateral   decisions   that   affect  workers’  wages   and   benefits.   For   example,   in   1998   the  
government  announced  a  wage  freeze.  This  meant  that  unions  would  not  be  able  to  bargain  for  
higher  wages   the   following  year.  The  unions   filed  a   lawsuit  against   the  government  alleging  a  
violation   of   their   collective   bargaining   rights   given   they   were   not   consulted   before   the  
announcement.  The  Supreme  Court  ruled  in  favour  of  the  unions,  establishing  the  union’s  right  
to   engage   in   discussions   over   wage   levels86.   In   October   2013,   the   government   announced  
another  unilateral  wage  freeze87,  which  unions  may  challenge  in  court88.  If  the  freeze  is  found  to  
be  legal,  then  unions’  influence  will  be  constrained  for  the  next  two  years  as  they  will  be  unable  
to   affect   any   changes   to  wages   and   benefits.   If   it   is   found   to   be   illegal,   then   unions  will   have  
cemented   a   greater   ability   to   influence   decisions   governing   pay   and   benefits.   In   both   cases,  
unions   referred   to   the   courts   for   protection   after   their   influence   was   diminished.   However,  
court  cases  are  expensive  and  time  consuming  which  may  limit  a  union’s  ability  to  consult  the  





Actors  outside  unions  and  the  government  showed  how  they  and  other  external  players  helped  
shape  the  parameters  of  government  concessions.  Human  resource  shortages  in  Zambia’s  health  
sector   render   each   worker   more   essential   to   the   public.   This   has   the   effect   of   protecting  
workers   from  permanent  unemployment,  especially   in   the  absence  of  adequate  replacements.  
Zambia’s  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  require  that  the  country  increase  the  number  
                                                                                                                           
  
80  Representative  of   the  Ministry  of  Labour,   interview,   June  2014;  Union   representative,   interview,   July  
2014;  Representative  from  Zambia  Union  of  Nurses  Organisation  #1,  interview,  July  2014.  
81  Consultant  to  the  JERG  exercise,  interview,  June  2014.  
82  Fashoyin,  2007.  
83  Expert  on  Zambian  labour  relations,  interview,  July  2014.  
84  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Labour,  interview,  June  2014.  
85  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  UTH  nurse  #2,  interview,  July  2014.  
86  Council   of   the   University   of   Zambia   and   Another   v.   Allied   Workers   Union,   no.   1   of   1999   (Zambian  
Supreme  Court,  1  January  1999).    
87  Banda,  2013.  
88  ‘Wage  Freeze’,  2014.  
89  Representative  of  Health  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
  
     
ZAMBIA	  SOCIAL	  SCIENCE	  JOURNAL	     
  
47    
of   health   workers   in   order   to   ‘right-­‐size’   the   industry90.  While   the   government   initially   fired  
hundreds  of  nurses  at  UTH,  patients  were  discharged   from  the  hospital  without   full   recovery.  
Many   crucial   operations  were  postponed  because   they   lacked   capable,   experienced   staff91.  To  
solve   these   issues   and   appease   the   public,   the   government   insisted   that   UTH   hire   graduate  
students.   Although   this   solution   seemed   viable   at   the   time   it   proved   ineffective   for   certain  
departments.   Operating   theatres,   for   example,   normally   employ   highly   trained   nurses   with  
years  of   technical   experience,  whereas  graduate   students  are  generalists.  UTH  was,   therefore,  
forced  to  close  its  theatre  ward  for  two  months  following  the  strike92.  The  shortage  of  labour  in  
such  a  crucial  sector  forced  a  response  from  the  government.  There  was  an  agreement  to  slowly  
rehire   fired   nurses.   It   is   unclear   how  much   influence   the   unions   had   in   this   decision,  mostly  
because   the   rehiring   decisions   and   processes   were   not   publicised   in   mainstream  media,   but  
many   doubt   that   unions   had   anything   to   do   with   the   rehiring   decision93.   Thus,   while   the  
essential  and  human  resource-­‐deficient  nature  of  the  health  industry  might  have  been  leveraged  
by   unions   to   protect   workers   from   permanent   unemployment,   it   also   contributed   to   the  
government’s  quick  firing  of  nurses.  
  
Relatedly,  the  importance  of  the  industry  to  the  public  also  means  that  the  government  is  more  
likely   to   cater   to   health   workers’   interests   for   political   purposes.   Nurses   work   directly   with  
patients,   many   of   who   are   seriously   ill.   This   creates   the   image   that   nurses   and   doctors   are  
saving  Zambian  lives,  an  image  that  is  hard  to  ignore  given  the  prevalence  of  health  issues  such  
as   the   HIV/AIDS   epidemic.   For  many,   this   ‘hero’   imagery   is  more   potent   than   it  would   be   in  
other   industries.   For   example,   while   teachers   help   educate   Zambian   children   to   become  
productive   members   of   society,   the   image   of   misbehaving   children   is   not,   from   a   public  
perspective,  as  worrisome  as  the  image  of  dying  patients.  For  this  reason,  many  believe  that  the  
nurses  carry  more  political  clout   than  teachers.  A  representative   from  the  Ministry  of  Finance  
went  so  far  as  to  speculate  that  if  teachers  were  to  strike,  they  would  be  fired  immediately  and  
permanently   because   their   image   is   not   as   powerful   as   that   of   the   nurses94.   Politicians   are  
largely   aware   of   this   clout,   so   they   often   try   to   appear   sympathetic   to   nurses   publicly.   Some  
even   believe   this   clout   also   explains  why   the  Minister   of   Labour   visited  UTH   after   the   strike.  
There  were   probably   concerns   he   genuinely  wanted   to   address,   but   the  meeting  was   also   an  
opportunity   to   boost   his   public   perception   using   an   image   to   which   the   public   assigns  
importance95.  One  might  expect  unions  to  be  able  to  leverage  the  political  clout  generated  by  the  
nature  of  the  industry,  and  that  may  occur  at  times,  but  the  fact  that  nurses  got  relatively  small  
wage   increases   in   2013   and   were   fired   for   striking   without   concessions   suggests   that   this  
political  clout  is  not  a  controlling  factor.  
  
International   bodies   that   are   specifically   interested   in   the   health   industry   can   restrict   the  
actions  of  the  government.  Health  donors,  for  example,  expect  to  see  improved  health  outcomes  
in   Zambia.   Such   outcomes   become   increasingly   difficult   when   nurses   are   laid   off.   Thus,   the  
government,   which   may   have   preferred   to   keep   nurses   unemployed   to   prove   its   point,  
ultimately   rehired   nurses   in   part   because   of   the   political   pressure   of   donors   what   wanted   a  
significant   return   on   their   investment96.   Donors   can   therefore   help   unions   protect   some  
workers  from  unemployment.  However,  the  fact  that  striking  nurses  were  all  fired  suggests  that  
this   variable   does   not   work   very   strongly   to   unions’   advantage.   On   net,   the   influence   of   the  
public  and  other  external  players  further  worked  to  hinder  union  influence  in  this  case.  
                                                                                                                           
  
90  Former  World  Bank  expert,  interview,  June  2014.  
91  Representative  of  the  University  of  Zambia  School  of  Medicine,  interview,  June  2014.  
92  Representative  of  UTH  Department  of  Surgery,  interview,  June  2014.  
93  Former  UTH  nurse  #1,  interview,  July  2014;  Former  World  Bank  expert,  interview,  June  2014.  
94  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
95  Two  representatives  of  Civil  Servants  and  Allied  Workers  Union  of  Zambia,  interview,  July  2014.  
96  Former  World  Bank  expert,  interview,  June  2014.  
  
     






Political   will   stood   out   in   many   respondents’   eyes   as   an   especially   influential   factor   in  
determining  outcomes  for  unions.  While  all  of  the  preceding  variables  have  been  shown  to  work  
against   union   influence,   this   stands   out   as   a   variable   that   has   both   increased   and   decreased  
union  influence.  The  fact  that  political  will  is  unique  among  these  variables  merits  a  discussion  
of  what  affects  political  will.  While  this  is  likely  an  incomplete  list  of  factors,  three  main  factors  
were  identified  in  this  case  study:  the  ruling  party’s  goals,  public  pressure,  and  donor  pressure.  
The  goals  of  the  ruling  party  affected  the  political  will  of  the  government  in  two  ways.  For  one,  
the  party’s  stated  objective  of  increasing  money  in  people’s  pockets  contributed  to  a  willingness  
to   allow   the   large  wage   increases   seen   in   2013.   Their  working   class-­‐focused   campaign   led   to  
especially   high   expectations   and   pressure   from   public   sector   workers 97 .   Second,   the  
government’s  goal  of  maintaining  a  sense  of  order  led  to  the  desire  to  fire  nurses  who  were  seen  
as   acting   out.   Public   pressure,   particularly   from   voters   who   did   not   approve   of   the   firing   of  
nurses,  shaped  the  political  will  that  allowed  some  nurses  to  be  rehired.  Third,  as  noted,  donor  
pressure,  especially  from  donors  who  want  to  see  positive  results  in  Zambia’s  health  sector,  also  
pushed  the  government  to  want  to  rehire  some  nurses98.    
  
The  numerous  ways  in  which  the  political  will  of  the  government  affected  union  influence  in  the  
case  study  prove  illuminating.  Political  will  can  either  enhance  or  undermine  union  influence  in  
wage  negotiations.   The  Patriotic   Front   (PF)   administration   ran  on   the  motto   that   they  would  
increase  money  in  people’s  pockets.  This  motto  informed  their  approach  to  public  sector  pay  in  
201399.  The  government’s  minimum  wage  policy   led   to   large   increments   for  non-­‐professional  
workers   in   2013.   It   seems   that   these   increments   came   about   for   reasons   other   than   union  
power.  The  General  Secretary  of  the  National  Union  of  Public  Service  Workers,  which  represents  
many  non-­‐professionals,  even  gave  credit  to  the  government,  not  his  union,  for  generating  such  
a   large   increment.   His   praise   went   as   far   as   thanking   the   government   for   ‘liberating’   his  
members100 .   This   language   reflects   the   power   of   government’s   political   will   over   union  
outcomes.  
  
The   government’s   political   will   sometimes   works   against   unions.   The   Ministry   of   Finance  
suggests  certain  limits  on  bargaining  outcomes.  Still,  the  government’s  bargaining  team  offered  
more  than  the  Ministry  of  Finance  wanted  to  in  2013101,  showing  diverging  tendencies  between  
the   Ministry   of   Finance   and   central   administration.   Unions   can   leverage   the   political   will   of  
some  branches  of  government  to  generate  increases  beyond  what  other  branches  would  prefer.    
  
The  government’s  desire   to  win  voters’   support  affects  unions’  ability   to  realise  demands  and  
protect  workers.  As   a   representative  of   the  Ministry  of  Finance  noted,   ‘No  politician  wants   to  
cause  a   strike’,   as   that  would  be  unpopular  with  voters.  Unions   can  presumably   leverage   this  
into  increased  strike  leverage,  especially  when  the  ruling  party  takes  as  pro-­‐worker  lines  as  the  
PF  administration  has.  Furthermore,  the  promises  of  wage  increases  and  ultimate  disregard  for  
the  Ministry  of  Finance’s  parameters  during  the  2013  negotiations  were  in  large  part  an  effort  
to   attract   favour  with   voters  who   benefit102.   This  meant   that,   instead   of   ‘rightsizing’   the   civil  
service   as   had   been   recommended   by   experts,   the   government   simply   looked   at   raising  
                                                                                                                           
  
97  Representative  of  the  World  Bank,  interview,  June  2014.  
98  Former  World  Bank  expert,  interview,  June  2014.  
99  Sinyangwe,  2013.  
100  Chanda,  2013,  para.  5.  
101  Representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  #2,  interview,  June  2014.  
102  Ibid.  
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salaries103,  making   it   easier   for   unions   to   see   their   demands  met.   The  Minister   of   Labour  has  
been   seen   as   ‘aligned  with   unions   against   government’   as   a   proponent   of   the   new  minimum  
wage  that  led  to  such  large  salary  hikes  in  2013.  The  political  appeal  of  siding  with  unions  is  also  
visible   during   campaigns,   when   candidates   all   play   to   unions.   Furthermore,   the   fact   that  
opposition   parties   play   to   unions   as   often   as   they   do   indicates   that   there   are   advantages   in  
appealing  to  unions104,  which  again  makes  it  easier  for  unions  to  receive  what  they  want.  
  
The   political   desire   to   appeal   to   unions   and   their   members   can   lead   to   overstatements,  
promises,  and  a  misleading  framing  of  issues.  For  instance,  the  Minister  of  Labour  promised  to  
change   perceived   injustices   that   had   led   to   the   October   strike,   at   least   in   part   to   appeal   to  
nurses105.  This  took  the  matter  out  of  unions’  hands,  as  nurses  felt  they  had  the  government  on  
their  side,  so  they  illegally  struck  despite  union  leaders’  objections,  making  it  harder  for  unions  
to  win  benefits  and  protect  their  members.  
  
Furthermore,   the   government’s   ability   to   fire   union   leaders   and   other   civil   servants   affects  
unions’  ability  to  protect  workers  and  bargain  effectively.  The  government’s  will  to  instil  a  sense  
of  order  made  them  intent  on  sending  a  clear  message  that  strikes  are  not  tolerable.  This  desire  
was  so  strong  that  some  innocent  nurses  were  ‘caught  in  the  crossfire’  and  terminated106.  This  
makes   it  harder   for  unions   to  protect  workers   from  unemployment  as  nurses  were  dismissed  




The   factors   examined   in   this   study  mostly  worked   to   the   detriment   of   union   influence   in   the  
case   study   examined.   This   raises   questions   regarding   how   to   explain   Zambia’s   large   public  
service   wage   bill   and   the   sizeable   increases   enjoyed   by   many   civil   servants   after   the   2013  
negotiations.   To   explain   this   apparent   inconsistency,   one   factor,   political   will,   stands   out   as  
working  heavily  to  unions’  advantage  in  the  cases  when  unions  benefited  most,  such  as  the  2013  
negotiations.  Conversely,  it  was  aligned  against  unions  in  cases  where  they  were  most  defeated,  
such  as  the  firing  of  UTH  nurses.  One  can  therefore  infer  that  this  factor  has  had  a  major  impact  
on  outcomes  for  unions.  
  
While   this   is   an   important   factor   that   determines   the   degree   of   influence   unions   have,   it   is   a  
factor  whose  degree  is  determined  primarily  by  the  government,  unlike  the  other  factors.  While  
it  may  be  influenced  by  outside  factors  such  as  voter  pressure  or  lobbying,  the  final  decision  of  
whether   or   not   the   government   supports   wage   and   benefit   increases   or   protecting   workers  
from   unemployment   ultimately   lies   with   the   government   itself.   This   resolves   the   seeming  
paradox  of  unions  seeing  large  increases  in  pay  during  the  2013  negotiations  but  being  unable  
to  stop  the  government  from  firing  all  striking  nurses  at  UTH.  It  is  not  so  much  that  unions  were  
especially  powerful  in  the  former  case  and  were  less  powerful  in  the  latter  case,  but  rather  that  
political  will  was  aligned  with  unions  in  the  former  case  and  against  them  in  the  latter  case.  It  
seems,  then,  that  government  is  the  institution  that  is  best  able  to  influence  outcomes  affecting  
unions.  Outcomes   that   seem   to   speak   to  unions’   strength   are   less   a   result   of   unions’   strength  
than  of  political  will.  It  is  therefore  fallacious  to  assume  that,  because  outcomes  in  a  certain  case  
were   in   line  with  what   unions  wanted,   that   this   imply   that   Zambian  public   sector   unions   are  
powerful.  An  alternate  and  more  viable  explanation  would  be  that  the  government  happened  to  
                                                                                                                           
  
103  Former  World  bank  expert,  interview,  June  2014.  
104  Representative  of  the  World  Bank,  interview,  June  2014.  
105   Former   UTH   nurse   #1,   interview,   July   2014;   Union   representative,   interview,   July   2014;  
Representative  of  UTH  Department  of  Surgery,  interview,  June  2014.  
106  Representative  of  the  UTH  Department  of  Medicine,  interview,  June  2014.  
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support  the  same  outcomes  that  unions  did.  Zambian  public  sector  unions  may  therefore  not  be  
as  powerful  as  they  seemed.  
  
This   study   encountered   a   number   of   limitations.   First,   logistical   difficulties   meant   that   the  
Public   Service  Management   Division  was   not   interviewed.   As   they   are   the   employer   for   civil  
servants,  this  gap  may  mean  that  major  trends  and  explanations  were  overlooked.  Furthermore,  
because   research   was   conducted   within   the   span   of   only   two   months,   other   relevant  
stakeholders  were  not  interviewed  who  could  have  contributed  to  this  research.  This  study  also  
focused  on   the  Zambian  public  health  sector   to   theorise  about   the  Zambian  civil   service  more  
broadly,   but   the   nature   of   the   health   sector   may   present   confounding   variables   that   limit  
generalizability.  Additionally,  because  this  research  took  place  in  Lusaka,  all  interviewees  came  
from   Lusaka   (except   one   union   representative  who  was   interviewed   in   Livingstone,   but  who  
works  mainly  in  Lusaka),  which  may  limit  generalisability  to  regions  outside  Lusaka.  Moreover,  
this  case  study  focused  on  the  strikes  at  UTH  even  though  other  hospitals  in  Lusaka  and  across  
the   nation   saw  nurses   strike   as  well,  meaning   some   conclusions  may   not   be   generalizable   to  
other  hospitals.  For  these  reasons,  this  study  should  not  be  treated  as  final  and  conclusive,  but  
rather  as  a  starting  point  for  further  investigations.  
  
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  findings  are  preliminary107.  Further  research  should  examine  
other  Zambian  civil  service  sectors  to  determine  the  validity  of  these  theories  across  contexts.  
These  theories  could  also  be  quantified,  perhaps  with  survey  data,  to  determine  if  attitudes  and  
trends  suggested  here  hold  true  across  larger  populations.  These  theories  could  also  be  updated  
and   adjusted   as   necessary   in   light   of   the   outcomes   future   negotiations.   Anything   revealed   by  
how   future   cases   play   out   should   be   compared   against   these   results   and   analyses,   and  
conclusions  should  be  updated  as  necessary.  
  
That   noted,   these   findings   have   implications   for   questions   facing   the   labour   movement,  
including  Simutanyi’s   (2011)  question  as   to  whether  unions  should   forge  an  alliance  with   the  
ruling  political  party  or   remain  autonomous  and   lobby   for  a  pro-­‐worker  agenda.  As  he  noted,  
‘What  strategy  the  labour  movement  will  take  will  greatly  depend  on  a  strategic  assessment  of  
its   relative   strength   and   influence  within   the   political   process’   (24).   Findings   that   the   labour  
movement,   at   least   in   the   public   sector,   has   been   unable   to   recapture  much   influence   in   the  
early  PF  years  may  suggest  that  alliances  with  even  seemingly  pro-­‐worker  political  parties  may  
not  be  as  fruitful  as  unions  would  like.  
  
Questions  of  union  influence  clearly  have  implications  for  workers  and  unions.  But,  less  directly,  
they  also  affect  ongoing  civil  service  reform  efforts,  as  unions  wielding  influence  can  affect  what  
the   government   can   do.   Assuming   the   validity   of   this   study’s   conclusions,   if   reform   is   indeed  
being   hampered,   is   the   result   of   the   government’s   behaviour   more   than   unions   wielding  
excessive  influence.  This  affects  how  pro-­‐reform  advocates  could  best  go  about  making  changes  
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